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OVERVIEW — This paper examines the use of research, demonstration, and
program waiver authorities to test new approaches to the delivery of and pay-
ment for health care services in federally financed health coverage programs
such as Medicare, Medicaid, and the State Children’s Health Insurance Pro-
gram. This background paper examines the mechanics of waivers as well as
their history and political context in shaping public programs. It also explores
the ways the changing state-federal relationship and the ever-growing demand
for state flexibility have driven waiver policy.
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Shaping Public Programs through
Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP
Waivers: The Fundamentals
Research, demonstration, and program waiver authorities are important
vehicles for testing innovative strategies in public programs. The Web
site of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS, formerly
the Health Care Financing Administration, or HCFA) lists more than 600
active research and demonstration projects and more than 350 other pro-
grams approved through waivers. The sheer number of projects is an in-
dication of their importance in shaping and evaluating the way services
are delivered.
AN INTRODUCTION TO WAIVERS
The Social Security Act (SSA) provides the authority to “waive” certain pro-
visions of the Medicare, Medicaid, and State Children’s Health Insurance
Program (SCHIP) statutes that enable states and the federal government to
explore new approaches to providing health care services. Waiver authority
in Medicaid and Medicare plays several roles: it permits states and the fed-
eral government to test new, innovative, and more cost-effective approaches
to delivering and financing health care services; it can be a vehicle for
advancing an administration’s policy and political priorities; and it gives
Congress an opportunity to direct the Department of Health and Hu-
man Services to test promising new payment and delivery mechanisms.
The flexibility provided through waivers has enabled many states to fun-
damentally reshape their Medicaid programs, to the point that, in many
states, the demonstrations have effectively become the Medicaid programs.
Research and demonstration projects have also brought major changes
to Medicare, particularly in the 1980s. The Medicare program, for ex-
ample, used demonstration authority to test the prospective payment
system for hospitals that is used widely today, not only by Medicare but
also by many private insurers. Congress has also mandated a number of
specific research and demonstration projects, such as social health main-
tenance organizations (S/HMOs) and competitive pricing projects to test
alternative payment systems and innovations in health care delivery.
While there are many provisions that cannot be waived (such as Medi-
care eligibility and freedom of choice), use of these authorities over the
years has changed the face of the Medicaid, Medicare, and welfare pro-
grams by permitting innovation.
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Medicaid: The Basics
The Medicaid program uses waiver authority to alter provisions of the
statute that otherwise prevent states from implementing certain types of
programs. The program is structured around several fundamental prin-
ciples that act as guidelines for states. While the rules provide a great
deal of flexibility, there are also protections in place to ensure that Medic-
aid beneficiaries are treated fairly and appropriately. These program stan-
dards are known, in policy shorthand, as amount, duration, and scope; com-
parability; and statewideness:
■ Amount, duration, and scope—The statute requires that each Medic-
aid service category must be “sufficient in amount, duration, and scope
to reasonably achieve its purpose.” States may vary the amount, dura-
tion, and scope of services they cover, within general limits. For ex-
ample, although the law permits states to impose day limits on ser-
vices, a state would not be permitted to limit coverage for inpatient
hospital care to only one day per year.
■ Comparability—Medicaid benefits must also be comparable across
the eligible population, meaning that states may not discriminate by
providing different services to specific groups or limit services based on
diagnosis, type of illness, or condition.
■ Statewideness—States are generally required to make Medicaid
benefits available to all eligible individuals, regardless of where in the
state they live. For example, a state that covers prescription drugs must
make that coverage available in both its rural and urban areas.1
While these principles are a key aspect of the Medicaid program struc-
ture, the federal government is authorized to waive these and other statu-
tory provisions for purposes of research and to permit states to demon-
strate new and innovative service delivery and financing strategies. Med-
icaid waivers can be divided into two categories: research and demonstra-
tion projects and program waivers.
Research and demonstration projects are authorized under Section 1115 of
the Social Security Act (SSA). Section 1115, enacted in 1962, gives broad
authority to the secretary of the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices (DHHS) to authorize “any experimental, pilot or demonstration project
which, in the judgment of the Secretary, is likely to assist in promoting the
objectives” of the programs covered by the SSA. These projects are usually
innovative and their designs require greater flexibility from the federal
government, in terms of the types and numbers of rules that are altered,
than program waivers. In addition, Section 1115 research and demonstra-
tion projects are required, by policy and practice, to include a research or
evaluation component, at least for the initial approval period.2 While Sec-
tion 1115 authority today is primarily associated with Medicaid, it also ap-
plies to several other titles of the SSA, including Supplemental Security
Income (SSI), Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF, formerly
Aid to Families with Dependent Children, or AFDC),3 and SCHIP.
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Medicaid program waivers are more limited in the types of projects that
can be implemented. Two types of program waivers were enacted in 1981
and are currently in use. Section 1915(b) authorizes states to implement
delivery models, such as mandatory enrollment in managed care, that re-
quire eligible beneficiaries to use certain providers to receive services. Sec-
tion 1915(c) authorizes states to provide home and community-based ser-
vices as an alternative to institutional care in hospitals, nursing homes, and
intermediate care facilities for persons with mental retardation (ICFs/MR).4
Medicare: The Basics
The Medicare program also relies on research and demonstration author-
ity to test new payment and delivery mechanisms. Section 402 of the 1967
Social Security Amendments, as amended by Section 222(b) of the 1972
Social Security Amendments, provides broad authority to research Medi-
care provider reimbursement mechanisms (other than prospective pay-
ment) and to cover a variety of services that are not normally covered
and to measure their effectiveness. It provides authority to waive the Medi-
care reasonable cost and reasonable charge requirements,5 and it is this
section that is most commonly used today for Medicare research and dem-
onstration initiatives. Section 222(a) of the Social Security Amendments
of 1972 authorizes the secretary to conduct experiments and demonstra-
tions that test alternative prospective payment methodologies.
Congress can also mandate that certain types of research and demonstra-
tion projects are conducted. Congress usually takes such action for promis-
ing approaches that it believes should be given immediate priority or should
be tested before they are implemented on a broader scale. For example,
over the years, Congress has used its authority to direct the DHHS secre-
tary to experiment with approaches to coordinating the delivery of acute
and long-term care in demonstration programs such as the Program of All-
Inclusive Care for the Elderly (PACE) and the S/HMO program.
Medicare research and demonstration projects differ from Medicaid dem-
onstrations in several important ways. Beneficiaries are treated differently
in that the Medicare program has no demonstration authority to waive
freedom of choice of providers; therefore, enrollment in managed care ar-
rangements is purely voluntary. There is also no ability under Medicare
demonstration authority to expand eligibility, whereas Medicaid has sev-
eral mechanisms for coverage expansion. Another important difference is
that Medicare is a national program, which leads to the expectation that
the same benefits and services will be offered nationwide to its beneficia-
ries. This expectation makes changes to the Medicare program more chal-
lenging because of the complexity of making changes on a national level.
Medicaid, on the other hand, essentially offers the potential of 50 very dif-
ferent states as laboratories for experimentation. Finally, Medicare also gen-
erally relies on voluntary participation of providers, which can make it
difficult to obtain their participation in demonstrations that could signifi-
cantly affect their revenues.
The Medicare program
has no demonstration
authority to waive free-
dom of choice of pro-
viders.
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Financing
An important aspect of all research and demonstration projects and pro-
gram waivers is the requirement for budget or cost neutrality. Although
applied somewhat differently in each waiver type, the principle is that
programs conducted under a demonstration project should not cost the
federal government more than would have been spent under program
rules without the demonstration. Cost neutrality for 1915(b) waivers and
cost effectiveness for 1915(c) waivers are statutory requirements that have
been in place since the first program waivers were proposed. Budget neu-
trality has been mandated by federal policy since 1983 and applies to both
Medicaid Section 1115 demonstration projects and Medicare demonstra-
tion projects.
The concept of budget neutrality has become a major driver in the nego-
tiation and approval process for research and demonstration projects.
During the 1970s and early 1980s, the only budgetary restriction placed
on projects was that the overall operating budget for research and dem-
onstration activities—the funds apportioned to HCFA6 to staff and evalu-
ate projects—could not exceed the amount specified in the president’s
budget. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) originally imple-
mented this restriction through the budget process in response to con-
cerns that some projects, especially hospital prospective payment system
(PPS) demonstrations, were significantly increasing program costs and
involved significant portions of the Medicare trust fund.
Over a period of several years, the OMB became increasingly concerned
about the large amount of program service costs that were tied to research
and demonstration projects.7 In 1983, an agreement between the OMB
and DHHS gave the OMB clearance authority for demonstration projects
and established the budget neutrality policy. Following that agreement,
the OMB used its authority to reject or delay a number of demonstration
projects and program expansions that it viewed as fiscally undesirable in
the tight budget atmosphere of the time. The more extensive review that
was necessary to assure budget neutrality also may have had a dampen-
ing effect on the number of projects being initiated. The OMB’s entry into
the approval process coincided with a sharp decline in the level of dem-
onstration project activity and, shortly thereafter, an increase in congres-
sionally mandated projects.8
The budget neutrality requirements for Medicaid Section 1115 demonstra-
tions have led states to pursue to a number of creative financing approaches
in order to expand coverage or services that would not usually be eligible
for federal matching funds. They have also led to many contentious nego-
tiations between states and DHHS. (See further discussion below.) In Medi-
care, the budget neutrality analysis of costs with and without the waiver is
done in a similar manner; however, the process is less contentious because
providers are not usually at risk for cost overruns unless, for example, a
managed care demonstration using capitated payments is being tested.
The OMB became in-
creasingly concerned
about the large amount
of program service costs
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Process and Politics
Another important aspect of demonstration projects and program waiv-
ers is that they often reflect the policy priorities of the administration in
office at the time the proposal is approved. Precedents set through ap-
proval of a project, though frequently difficult to negotiate initially, can
clear the path for similar projects in the future. Administration policy can
be influenced by a variety of interest groups, and priorities are often based
on the leading health care delivery and financing concepts of the day. For
example, managed care has come in and out of favor over the years, and
demonstration approvals reflect those trends. The current enthusiasm for
moving away from institutional care and toward community-based ser-
vices for the elderly and those with disabilities is illustrated by a tremen-
dous amount of program waiver activity in this area.
Waiver proposals are initiated in several different ways. In Medicaid, pro-
posals are most often generated by states looking for flexibility to try new
approaches to program administration and service delivery. CMS also
encourages projects by providing written guidance and suggestions for
certain types of proposals that would be of interest. For example, in its
guidance for the Health Insurance Flexibility and Accountability (HIFA)
demonstration initiative, CMS strongly encouraged states to integrate pre-
mium assistance programs with Medicaid/SCHIP. CMS also issues more
formal requests for research and demonstration proposals, usually related
to Medicare, that are published in the Federal Register. These solicitations
set out criteria for participation in specific research and demonstration or
evaluation projects.
No matter how proposals are initiated, all go through negotiations be-
tween the proposers and DHHS during which the design features of the
proposals may be significantly changed. Medicare demonstration pro-
posals that respond to specific solicitations may be somewhat more
straightforward because the solicitation has laid out the parameters for
the proposal. Nonetheless, the negotiation and approval process for re-
search and demonstration projects has often been criticized for its diffi-
culty and the amount of time it takes. However, it is important to note
that the internal review process can include a large number of federal
staff representing various parts of the administration—from the CMS re-
gional office all the way to the OMB and the White House—and each
component must agree with the terms of approval. The majority of time
is often spent on reviewing whether the proposal meets the budget neu-
trality test. Alterations to the budget neutrality formula can affect the project
design, the size of the expansion, the funding mechanism, and even the list
of covered services. Even after the project has been approved, however, the
proposer and DHHS must work out a host of design and implementation
issues (such as enrollment, marketing, evidence of coverage contracts, pro-
vider contracts, and grievance and appeals systems) before the program
can get under way. Nonetheless, research and demonstration projects
Precedents set through
approval of a project
can clear the path for
similar projects in the
future.
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and program waivers provide the best vehicle currently available to test
new approaches to expanding coverage, controlling costs, and improv-
ing quality of care.
Evaluation
Most demonstration projects are evaluated to determine the success of
the project in achieving its research and policy objectives. DHHS may
contract with independent research organizations to evaluate a specific
project or group of projects. In recent years, as its research budget has
decreased, DHHS has placed its priority on evaluating its Medicare dem-
onstrations and has required some Medicaid and SCHIP agencies to pro-
duce their own evaluations. Because these evaluation efforts, particularly
in Medicaid, are sometimes hampered by a lack of adequate data, their
effectiveness has been questioned. In addition, demonstrations that have
been widely replicated have been criticized for moving away from the
original research nature of the waiver authority that initially used a more
limited experimental design.9 However, one could argue that the experi-
ence gained from the more liberal use of demonstrations and program
waivers has permitted the program to develop at a much more rapid
pace than would have otherwise been possible, especially given the lack
of congressional willingness to “open up” the Medicaid statute.
Theoretically, successful programs could be adopted by Congress and
made permanent. In practice, however, the interaction between the legis-
lative and executive branches has not always been smooth. Congress has
acted in some instances before DHHS has fully evaluated a project’s re-
sults, as was the case with the legislation that created a hospice benefit in
the Medicare program. Time lags in completing evaluations have also
been an issue. At other times, Congress has been slow to legislate changes
for seemingly successful programs. For example, the PACE program op-
erated under demonstration status for 11 years before Congress acted to
make it a permanent part of the Medicare and Medicaid statutes.
It is important to note that statutory changes often do not include all of
the elements that are needed in order for a demonstration project to con-
tinue to operate without waivers, in some cases resulting in low state and
provider participation rates. For example, because provisions of the new
state plan option do not provide as much flexibility as is available under
the waiver authority, only 15 states have converted their Section 1915(b)
waivers into state plan amendments in the six years since enactment. Dem-
onstration results may also be difficult to generalize to the nation as a
whole due to unique features within a particular project or area of the
country. Moreover, no matter how successful the demonstrations might
appear, members of Congress may continue to disagree with certain ap-
proaches to service delivery.
Statutory changes of-
ten do not include all
of the elements that
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MEDICAID SECTION 1115 DEMONSTRATIONS
IN DEPTH
Statutory Provisions
Section 1115 permits the DHHS secretary to approve projects consistent
with objectives of certain programs authorized under the SSA. Section
1115 may be used to waive certain sections of several titles of the SSA,
including Titles I (Old-Age Assistance), X (Aid to the Blind), XIV (Aid to
the Permanently and Totally Disabled), XVI (SSI for Aged, Blind, and
Disabled), XIX (Medicaid), or part A or D of Title IV (TANF/AFDC). Sec-
tion 1115 authority has rarely been used in relation to the Social Security
program. It has been used most extensively to alter Medicaid and, prior
to welfare reform in 1996, the AFDC program. Section 1115 authority also
applies to SCHIP, which was enacted as part of the Balanced Budget Act
(BBA) of 1997, and demonstration projects are underway in seven states.10
The first provision of Section 1115, Section 1115(a)(1), allows the secretary
to waive provisions of Section 1902 of the Medicaid statute, the key sec-
tion that contains the state plan requirements. (Each state operates its
Medicaid program under a plan that is approved by CMS.) Section 1902
outlines the information that must be included in the state plan and sets
the federal parameters within which states must operate. The state plan
describes the states’ Medicaid eligibility criteria and the services that will
be offered, as well as the service delivery and payment methodologies
the state uses in administering Medicaid. For example, under an 1115
demonstration proposal, a state might propose to use income as the sole
criterion in determining eligibility. (Historically, states have considered
an individual’s assets or have disregarded certain types of income, such
as child care, in calculating financial eligibility for the program). States
have also proposed modifying the benefit package to provide certain ben-
efits to one group, such as pregnant substance abusers, and not to others.
Perhaps more significantly, Section 1115(a)(2) permits the secretary to pro-
vide federal matching payments for state costs that would not otherwise
be matched under Section 1903, the section that contains funding require-
ments. It is this “costs-not-otherwise-matchable” authority that has been
widely used for statewide health care reform demonstrations that expand
coverage to new populations—such as childless adults—and services that
Medicaid does not normally cover. Another common use, prior to enact-
ment of the BBA, was to permit states to contract with health mainte-
nance organizations (HMOs) that did not meet the Medicaid participa-
tion requirements11 and, therefore, would not usually be eligible to re-
ceive Medicaid reimbursement. Because covering new populations and
services has the potential to greatly increase state and federal costs of the
program, budget neutrality is often a major point of contention.
Section 1115 research and demonstration projects are, theoretically, ap-
proved for a limited period of time—generally five years. However, in
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practice, many demonstrations have operated for far longer and to date,
demonstrations have only been terminated at a state’s request. For example,
Arizona’s Medicaid program has operated under Section 1115 authority
since its initial approval in 1982. In addition, the BBA included a provision
for one three-year renewal period after the first five years of operation. The
ability to extend approvals for these demonstrations was affirmed in the
Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection Act
of 2000 (BIPA), which permitted the secretary to continue granting three-
year extensions to existing Section 1115 demonstration projects.
Financing Options
States have always had the ability to provide health coverage to any and
all of their residents, above and beyond the federal Medicaid guidelines.
However, if states choose to cover populations that are not eligible for
Medicaid services under federal rules (such as nondisabled adults with-
out children), they must do so with state-only funds, unless they are
granted demonstration authority that allows them to receive federal Med-
icaid matching funds (known as federal financial participation, or FFP)
for these populations. The financing of these types of expansions is often
the most complex part of the application process, because of the require-
ment for budget neutrality.
As described earlier, for a demonstration project to be considered budget
neutral, federal expenditures over the life of a demonstration must be no
greater than they would have been without the demonstration. In order to
maintain budget neutrality, states need to identify savings in their pro-
grams to offset the cost of any program expansion. There are several sources
of savings that states have used to fund Medicaid program expansions:
Managed Care Savings — Existing statewide Section 1115 demonstra-
tions have most commonly projected savings through the use of man-
aged care. Requiring Medicaid beneficiaries to enroll in managed care
plans has been an effective strategy to limit federal and state expendi-
tures. However, use of this source of savings is more limited now than in
early demonstrations due to rising premium costs and the fact that most
states are already using managed care to the maximum extent feasible.
Redirecting Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) Payments12
— States have proposed the use of allotted DSH funding on the premise
that the need to pay hospitals for services to indigent patients is reduced
when health insurance is provided for expansion populations. Some states
have successfully used DSH as a financing mechanism, but others have
been deterred by concerns regarding reduced DSH funding from the pro-
vider community. In addition, states’ proposals may not have a clear im-
pact on hospital costs, so DSH is not always a logical funding source.
Benefit and Cost-Sharing Savings — To the extent a state offers more
limited benefits than would normally be provided under Medicaid or
increases cost sharing to existing populations, the projected savings can
In order to maintain
budget neutrality, states
need to identify savings
in their programs to off-
set the cost of any pro-
gram expansion.
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be used to finance the expansion of services to new populations. For ex-
ample, Oregon’s demonstration, approved in 1993, established a priority
list of health services, which replaced the Medicaid benefit package for
all beneficiaries in the state. The resulting reduction in benefit costs, com-
bined with cost sharing and the use of managed care, permitted the state
to cover many uninsured individuals who had not previously been eli-
gible for Medicaid. This financing strategy has also been used more re-
cently under the HIFA initiative (see discussion below).
Calculating Budget Neutrality
The expenditure limit, or budget-neutrality cap, for research and demon-
stration projects is based on projections of what federal costs would have
been had there been no demonstration—sometimes called the without waiver
costs. The budget neutrality cap may apply to some or all of the project’s
service expenditures and may also include DSH expenditures.
Budget neutrality is calculated by first determining a state’s Medicaid costs
in a base year. The base year is usually the 12-month period for which the
most recent, complete program data are available. Growth rates are then
applied to the base year data to project future expenditures to create the
without waiver baseline. The growth rates are determined by using his-
torical caseload and expenditure data over the prior five-year period. The
lower of either this historical growth rate or the Medicaid growth rate in
the president’s budget is used to set the budget-neutral expenditure limit
for the demonstration. The with waiver costs, including any new popula-
tions or services, are then compared to the without waiver costs to estab-
lish that the project is budget-neutral. (See Figure 1 for a simplified illustra-
tion of how the budget neutrality cap may be calculated.)
* Base year costs include the number of enrollees (in member months) and costs per eligible individual for a given year.
** The cost per eligible individual is fixed based on the base-year costs and growth rate that have been negotiated for the “without waiver”costs.
FIGURE 1
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The budget neutrality cap is usually calculated on a per member per
month, or per capita, basis, eliminating financial exposure should enroll-
ment growth exceed projections. However, aggregate caps have occasion-
ally been used.13 In a budget-neutrality agreement with a per capita cap,
the cost per eligible individual is fixed during negotiations; however, to-
tal expenditures over the life of the demonstration will vary based on
actual enrollment. In a budget-neutrality agreement with an aggregate
cap, the total expenditures as determined during negotiations form an
overall cap on expenditures for the demonstration. Once established
through negotiations between the state and DHHS, the cap on demon-
stration costs generally is not changed during the approval period of the
demonstration. Negotiations around budget neutrality are often lengthy
and contentious, since the outcome is critical to a state’s ability to fully
fund the demonstration and receive federal matching payments, as well
as to the federal government’s ability to contain its costs.
Hypothetical Expansions — Since the mid-1990s, CMS and the OMB
have permitted hypothetical program expansions to be included in the with-
out waiver baseline. These hypothetical program expansions are program
elements that states have the authority to adopt under current law but
which are not currently part of the state’s Medicaid program. For example,
a state may propose to provide health coverage to children up to 185
percent of the federal poverty level, which is above the mandated Medic-
aid eligibility levels and can be accomplished through the use of existing
law. In a demonstration proposal, the hypothetical expenditures for these
as yet uncovered children may be included in the base-year calculations,
effectively raising the expenditure limit for the demonstration. States have
been using this creative method of calculating budget-neutrality expen-
diture limits to pursue their program expansions since the mid-1990s.
This approach to financing has been criticized by the General Accounting
Office (GAO) almost from the moment of its inception because the GAO
believes that this methodology artificially inflates the amount the federal
government would pay in the absence of the waiver.14
1115s, SCHIP, and Allotment Neutrality
As mentioned earlier, Section 1115 demonstration authority also applies
to the SCHIP program. Because of its unique funding formula that pro-
vides a higher, enhanced federal matching rate, states have shown great
interest in utilizing the demonstration authority to shape SCHIP programs
in ways that better meet states’ needs and maximize the use of available
federal funds.
The advent of SCHIP and the ability to use monies from the state’s SCHIP
allotment15 for demonstration expansions has altered the budget neutral-
ity equation. When SCHIP funds are used, allotment neutrality rather than
budget neutrality applies. Instead of obtaining savings to finance cover-
age expansions, a state may use the unspent portion of its SCHIP allot-
ments up to the annual allotment cap, as well as currently redistributed
When SCHIP funds are
used, allotment neu-
trality rather than bud-
get neutrality applies.
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funds.16 One advantage to this interpretation is that states can receive the
SCHIP enhanced federal matching payments for covering expansion
populations—including parents, pregnant women, and childless adults—
using the SCHIP allotment, rather than the state’s usual Medicaid match-
ing rate. However, the statutory funding formula includes a reduction in
allotments to states, known as “the SCHIP dip,” that began in 2002. This
decrease, in combination with continued increases in SCHIP enrollment
and the state fiscal crisis, has significantly compromised the program’s
viability as a funding source for states.
The GAO also has criticized this financing mechanism, particularly with
regard to program expansions that have used SCHIP funds to cover child-
less adults.17 The GAO argues that the use of SCHIP funding in this man-
ner does nothing to advance the primary objective of the program—pro-
viding health coverage for children. In January 2003, the GAO placed
Medicaid for the first time on its list of programs at high risk for fraud,
waste, abuse, or mismanagement, and Congress has launched an investi-
gation of state program integrity practices.18
Although CMS’ use of its waiver authority is only one of several reasons
for the GAO designation, it reflects the tension that historically has ex-
isted between the executive branch (including DHHS, the OMB, and the
White House) and the legislative branch (of which the GAO is an investi-
gative arm). At issue is the appropriate locus of control for program
changes. Demonstration projects are viewed by some as a mechanism for
states to make changes that are intended to be a permanent part of their
programs, thereby circumventing the federal legislative process and, ar-
guably, increasing Medicaid outlays outside of the federal budget pro-
cess. On the other hand, many of the advances in knowledge about health
care delivery and payment over the years have occurred through innova-
tive Medicaid research and demonstration projects.
SECTION 1115 DEMONSTRATIONS
DRIVING POLICY CHANGE
The ability to waive certain aspects of the SSA has given states significant
flexibility to experiment with new and innovative approaches to program
operation, service delivery, and financing. The outgrowth of these dem-
onstrations, in several cases, has been major legislative and policy change
that has altered the face of the programs forever.
Welfare Reform
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, many states began applying for Sec-
tion 1115 waivers in the AFDC program. These waivers were used to broaden
eligibility in AFDC and to extend Medicaid coverage beyond the 12 months
of transitional benefits normally provided to welfare recipients who re-
turned to work. They also streamlined and expanded eligibility in the Food
Stamp Program. The demonstrations—which eventually numbered more
At issue is the appro-
priate locus of control
for program changes.
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than 40—were states’ efforts at reforming the welfare system in the ab-
sence of federal legislation. In addition, the demonstrations illustrated
the administration’s willingness to permit, even encourage, significant
replication across states and confirmed a significant movement away from
the “research” nature of Section 1115 demonstrations.
The eventual enactment of the Personal Responsibility and Work Oppor-
tunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) obviated the need for states
to seek waivers to accomplish welfare reform.19 Many of the features of
PRWORA were based on the experience and design elements from the
welfare reform demonstrations, and states were able to use the funds pro-
vided by a new TANF block grant to continue pursuing their welfare
reform goals.
Medicaid in the 1990s: Statewide Health Care Reform
The use of the Section 1115 demonstration authority to alter the Medicaid
program has grown dramatically over the past ten years. While there were
many approved demonstrations prior to the 1990s, they tended to be small
in scope, have a limited number of participants, or take place only in
limited geographic areas. The waiver movement gained momentum when
the Clinton administration signaled its willingness to provide states with
more flexibility to design and operate public programs. Through nego-
tiations with the National Governors Association, the Clinton adminis-
tration publicly indicated its intent to provide more flexibility in design-
ing and financing Section 1115 demonstrations shortly after the president
was inaugurated in 1993. Then, on September 27, 1994, DHHS published
a Federal Register notice outlining its policy with regard to Section 1115
research and demonstration projects.20 This notice was significant because
DHHS articulated its intent to grant similar waivers to multiple states
and to allow projects to be carried out on a statewide basis. It also al-
lowed budget neutrality to be calculated over the life of the demonstra-
tion rather than on an annual basis. The ability to conduct such large-
scale projects in multiple states, combined with states’ desire to contain
what were viewed as unsustainable increases in health care costs and
significant levels of uninsurance, generated a new outpouring of health
system reform efforts.
The demonstrations that were approved in the 1990s effectively became
the vehicle for statewide health care reform (in the absence of national
health reform). Perhaps the most significant mechanism for statewide
reform was the shift toward managed care as a delivery system for the
Medicaid population. Concerns about rising health care costs are not a
new phenomenon—states had begun looking to managed care as a means
to control spiraling health care costs in the early 1980s. In the 1990s, many
states began to turn to managed care on a large-scale basis as a means of
improving access to care, decreasing health care costs, and using the sav-
ings to expand coverage. Through Section 1115, states were able to obtain
The demonstrations
approved in the 1990s
effectively became the
vehicle for statewide
health care reform (in
the absence of na-
tional health reform).
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waivers of Medicaid requirements relative to freedom of
choice of provider, statewide program implementation
(statewideness), and comparable services for all recipients
(comparability). These waivers permitted states to require
Medicaid-eligible individuals to enroll in managed care net-
works that operated in limited geographical areas of the state
and in which enhanced benefits were often offered. While
these requirements could also be waived under Section
1915(b), as discussed later, an important advantage of Sec-
tion 1115 was the ability to expand coverage to new popula-
tions and to alter payment mechanisms to certain providers
such as federally qualified health centers (FQHCs).21
By 1997, CMS had approved 14 statewide health care reform
demonstrations, 9 of which included expansions to previ-
ously uninsured populations; all of the demonstrations used
some form of mandatory managed care. Today, 16 statewide
demonstration projects continue to operate,22 covering over
8 million enrollees and accounting for about one-fifth of
Medicaid spending.23 (See Table 1). In fact, the popularity
and perceived success of mandatory managed care, both
under Section 1115 authority and under Section 1915(b), led
to legislation in 1997 allowing states to mandate enrollment
in managed care by amending the state Medicaid plan rather
than through the waiver process.
Other Medicaid Initiatives
Beginning in the late 1990s, two other types of Medicaid dem-
onstrations emerged as a result of changes that were occur-
ring in the health care arena.
Cash and Counseling Demonstrations — Three states (Ari-
zona, Florida, and New Jersey) received approval for cash
and counseling demonstrations in 1997. Driven by the demand
for consumer-directed care that grew out of the disability
rights and independent living movements, these demonstra-
tions test direct payment of cash benefits to individuals with
disabilities to purchase their own personal assistance services.
The Oregon Independent Choices demonstration approved
in November 2000 follows a similar model. These demon-
strations are significant in that it is the first time that the Medicaid pro-
gram has permitted cash allowances to be paid directly to beneficiaries
rather than providers. The current administration’s Independence Plus
Initiative has grown out of these demonstrations.
HIV/AIDS Demonstrations — These projects expand Medicaid coverage
to individuals with HIV/AIDS and are approved in three states—Massa-
chusetts, Maine, and the District of Columbia.24 With the introduction of
TABLE 1
Section 1115 Statewide




















* Kentucky’s demonstration was originally approved as a state-
wide project; however it has been implemented only in selected
areas of the state.
Source: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.
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antiretroviral therapies in the mid-to-late nineties, states and the ad-
ministration became interested in providing coverage to individuals with
HIV/AIDS who usually would not qualify for Medicaid. They theorized
that proving treatment early in the course of the disease would reduce
health care costs by delaying the onset of disability and decreasing the
use of more expensive hospitalization. These programs will be monitored
and evaluated over the next few years to compare actual results with
those proposed in the demonstration.
SCHIP: A New Era of Expansion
Almost from the date of the enactment of SCHIP in 1997, states were in-
terested in obtaining waivers to operate their programs, either to cover
groups of individuals that the statute excluded or to change other fea-
tures of the program, such as benefits and cost sharing. DHHS initially
delayed approval of SCHIP waivers because the department believed that
it could not determine what types of projects were appropriate without
first having experience with the new program. However, three states—
Missouri, New Mexico, and Wisconsin25—received approval for Section
1115 demonstrations to permit cost sharing and, in the case of Missouri, a
slight alteration of the benefit package. The rationale was that these SCHIP
programs were actually expansions of Medicaid, a program with which
HCFA did have experience.
In July 2000, HCFA issued long-awaited guidance on SCHIP demonstra-
tion projects that signaled additional flexibility for both Medicaid expan-
sion states and states with separate child health programs. This guidance
indicated that HCFA would consider projects that expanded coverage to
parents of children being served under SCHIP and pregnant women. It
was believed that expansions of this nature would assist in improving
enrollment of children, as well as providing much needed coverage for
uninsured adults. The guidance also outlined that the principle of allot-
ment neutrality, rather than budget neutrality, would apply. States were
particularly interested in this feature since it enabled them to use more of
their annual SCHIP allotments and receive the higher SCHIP matching
rate for their expansions. Four states were approved in 2001 to use SCHIP
funds to cover parents—Minnesota, Wisconsin, Rhode Island, and New
Jersey—and today a total of seven states provide parental coverage and
use SCHIP allotments to finance the expansions.26
MEDICAID PROGRAM WAIVERS
After protracted debate over ways to reform Medicaid early in the Reagan
administration, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA
1981) enacted a new type of waiver authority in the Medicaid program.
The authority for Medicaid program waivers, found at Sections 1915(b)
and (c) of the SSA, was intended to give states more administrative flex-
ibility to operate their programs based on experience that had been gained
It was believed that
SCHIP demonstrations
would assist in improv-
ing enrollment of chil-
dren, as well as provid-
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from research and demonstration projects in the areas of managed care
and long-term care. At the same time, the federal government retained
some additional control over states’ use of these new programs by re-
quiring that they be approved through a waiver process, and therefore
subject to greater scrutiny, rather than through the usual state plan amend-
ment process.
Freedom of Choice Waivers
Before the addition of Section 1915(b) to the Medicaid statute, beneficia-
ries could be enrolled in managed care organizations only on a voluntary
basis. In June 1980, 16 states and the District of Columbia had contracted
with HMOs or other types of prepaid plans, covering approximately 1
percent of all Medicaid recipients.27 So, as part of the following legislative
session, Congress agreed that mandatory enrollment in managed care
should be an optional service delivery mechanism for states. Today more
than 57 percent of the Medicaid population is served through some type
of managed care arrangement, either through Section 1915(b) waivers or
Section 1115 demonstrations. As of March 2003, 29 states had 49 approved
1915(b) program waivers.28
The Medicaid statute guarantees enrollees freedom of choice of provid-
ers in order to ensure access to services. Section 1915(b) of the SSA per-
mits states to use primary care case management systems (PCCMs)29 or
managed care organizations (MCOs) that restrict provider choice other
than in emergency circumstances. This section of the statute gives the
secretary authority to waive certain provisions of Section 1902 as neces-
sary. The provisions that are most commonly waived are those that re-
quire freedom of choice of providers, statewide implementation
(statewideness), and comparable services to be offered to all beneficiaries
(comparability). The secretary is specifically precluded, however, from
waiving the provisions that establish payments to rural health clinics and
FQHCs and payments to DSH hospitals for infants and young children.
The secretary also may not restrict freedom of choice for Medicaid family
planning services. In addition, there is no authority to expand eligibility,
which is the reason that many states pursued Section 1115 waivers in the
1990s rather than using the Section 1915(b) program authority. By law,
approvals of 1915(b) waivers are for two years and these programs must
be “cost-effective and efficient.” States can also provide additional ser-
vices using managed care savings under these programs.
The types of managed care programs established may provide either com-
prehensive medical services or may be a carve-out to manage specialty
services such as behavioral health or dental care. As a result, many states
have more than one waiver program. For example, a state may provide
managed primary and acute care services to families and children, as well
as providing specialty managed care services to other targeted popula-
tions. Selected provider arrangements in which beneficiaries are restricted
Today more than 57
percent of the Medicaid
population is served
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to receiving covered services from only a contracted facility, such as a
hospital, have also been approved under Section 1915(b) authority.
Cost-Neutrality — Cost-effectiveness review for these programs tradition-
ally has been based on comparison with what fee-for-service costs would
have been in absence of the waiver. CMS has recently implemented an al-
ternative method due to erosion of the fee-for-service base in areas where
there has been widespread use of managed care for a number of years.
Under the new methodology, renewals of Section 1915(b) waivers use ex-
penditures in the previous two-year period as the base costs. These costs
are then trended forward using adjustments (such as for inflation) to deter-
mine the cost-effective amount for the current two-year approval period.
This methodology is intended to reduce the amount of negotiation needed
for CMS to determine cost-neutrality in order to approve the waivers.30
From Waiver to State Plan — The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 amended
the SSA to include a new Section 1932 state plan option as an alternative
to seeking waivers under Section 1915(b) and Section 1115. The new au-
thority permits states to implement mandatory managed care without
waivers and with no cost-neutrality provision.31 Approval is obtained
through a state plan amendment and there is no time limit on the ap-
proval. The managed care state plan provisions require that enrollees in
urban areas be offered a choice between at least two MCOs or between a
PCCM system and an MCO. In rural areas, there may be one MCO or
PCCM as long as there is choice of physicians or case managers. Enrollees
may be required to stay enrolled in an MCO or PCCM for up to 12 months.
Children with special needs, Medicare beneficiaries who are dually eligible
for Medicare and Medicaid, and American Indians who are members of
federally recognized tribes are exempt from mandatory enrollment.
Although Congress intended for Section 1932 to negate the need for waiv-
ers under Section 1915(b); that has not proven to be the case. As of August
2003, six years after the enactment of Section 1932, only 15 states have used
the state plan option to implement mandatory managed care. While for
some states, Section 1932 has been an effective means of avoiding the waiver
process, it has not worked for others. In part, this is due to the states’ famil-
iarity with Section 1915(b) and the process for obtaining approval. How-
ever, the restriction on the populations that may be included, particularly
children with special needs, has also discouraged many states from using
Section 1932 as an alternative to 1915(b). Consequently, the number of
1915(b) waivers has remained fairly constant over time.
Home and Community-Based Services Waivers
OBRA 1981 also enacted Section 1915(c), which permits states to provide a
set of home and community-based services (HCBS) to individuals who
would otherwise be institutionalized in hospitals, nursing homes, or ICFs/
MR. Before enactment of Section 1915(c), comprehensive long-term care
services were available only in institutional settings. Although mandatory
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home health services and optional personal care services were available
Medicaid benefits, states had largely restricted their use, allowing only
medically oriented types of services, such as skilled nursing care, to be
provided in the home. States also placed limits on the amounts of ser-
vices furnished. In enacting the legislation for HCBS waivers, Congress
hoped that long-term care costs could be contained if services were pro-
vided in settings, such as the home or community, that were less expen-
sive than institutions.
As with other waivers, while the Medicaid statute usually requires that
comparable services be provided to all enrollees statewide, the secretary
may waive these Medicaid requirements for statewideness and compa-
rability. For home and community-based services, the secretary may also
waive certain Medicaid income and resource rules. This permits states to
use more liberal income criteria for determining eligibility for these pro-
grams than they would use in regular Medicaid. The statute identifies
services that may be made available as home and community-based ser-
vices, including case management, homemaker/home health aide ser-
vices, personal care services, adult day health, habilitation services, and
respite care. It also permits the secretary to approve other services that
are cost-effective and needed to avoid institutionalization, which leads to
great diversity in the program. Waivers under Section 1915(c) are approved
for three years with an unlimited number of five-year extensions.
The statute requires that Section 1915(c) waivers be cost-effective. Cost-
effectiveness is determined by comparing the average per capita HCBS
costs to average per capita costs under the state plan without the waiver.
In addition, states use enrollment caps, made possible through waivers
of statewideness and comparability requirements, to help limit expendi-
ture growth in HCBS waiver programs. Enrollment caps help guard
against the “woodwork effect” which occurs because some eligible indi-
viduals prefer not to apply for institutional services but will apply for
and use community-based services
While six states had waivers approved by 1982, the overall growth in the
use of home and community-based services was gradual.32 In order to
encourage states to apply for the new HCBS waivers, HCFA developed a
model waiver system that was intended to expedite the review process by
limiting the federal government’s financial risk. Program size in model
waivers was limited to no more than 50 enrollees (later increased to 200).
Model waivers are still being used today, but many states have converted
them into traditional HCBS waivers as a means of increasing the num-
bers of individuals that can be served. There is now virtually no differ-
ence between model waivers and other HCBS waivers, other than the
size of the population served.
Another factor, the “cold bed” requirement, actually deterred states from
submitting waiver proposals in the first decade of the program. The
cold bed rule required states to demonstrate that an institutional bed
Congress hoped that
long-term care costs
could be contained if
services were provided
in settings that were
less expensive than in-
stitutions.
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was available for each individual to be enrolled in the HCBS waiver. In
many states where there were restrictions on building new nursing home
beds, this test was a serious impediment to HCBS waiver growth. Re-
moval of the cold-bed requirement in 1994 gave states more flexibility to
determine how much waiver programs could grow. At the same time
states’ commitment to reducing their institutional populations increased
as a result of legal challenges, skyrocketing institutional costs, and pres-
sure from the advocacy community. By 1999, every state except Arizona
(which offers similar services in its statewide Section 1115 demonstra-
tion) had at least one waiver serving persons with mental retardation or
developmental disabilities and one waiver for aged or physically disabled
persons. There are currently 261 HCBS waiver programs in operation.33
States have used home and community-based services to serve a wide
variety of populations, including seniors, people with physical disabili-
ties or HIV/AIDS, individuals with mental retardation and developmen-
tal disabilities, and people with traumatic brain injury. Because of the
diversity of the populations served, as well as other factors, such as unique
state delivery systems, payment structures, and consumer-driven service
models, it is difficult to generalize about the programs that have been
implemented under the authority of Section 1915(c). They represent a di-
verse group of programs that all use the same statutory waiver authority.
The GAO released a report in June 2003 examining federal oversight of
HCBS waiver programs under Medicaid that included strong criticism of
CMS and its regional offices in failing to consistently review the waiver
programs for quality assurance and compliance with federal and state
regulations. The GAO found that, in some regions, waiver programs were
rarely, if ever, reviewed and that several programs had been extended
without conducting an evaluation. CMS pointed out in its response to the
GAO that HCBS waiver reviews require a significant amount of resources
for which there is no line-item budget appropriation and that funding for
quality assurance activities must come from the operating budget. In ad-
dition, CMS asserted that the combination of the agency’s intensive in-
volvement in the program design, state quality assurance activities, and
organizational changes within the agency to place a greater emphasis on
quality confirm the importance of and commitment to the integrity of
home and community-based services.34
(b)/(c) Combination Waivers
In the late 1990s a new twist on program waivers was introduced when
the Section 1915(b)/(c) combination waiver came into existence. States
wanted to use managed care to provide long-term care services or to des-
ignate a limited pool of providers to deliver certain services. This ap-
proach could not be accomplished using Section 1915(b) alone because there
is no authority under 1915(b) to cover individuals who are eligible for Med-
icaid only through the more liberal income requirements in a HCBS waiver,
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nor is there authority to provide the types of services that are available
under Section 1915(c). At the same time, 1915(c) does not have authority to
restrict freedom of choice of providers, and states were leery of the more
rigorous approval process associated with Section 1115 demonstration
projects. Therefore, CMS agreed to consider “combination proposals” that
incorporate features from both types of program waiver authorities.
Although combined waivers have been extremely complex for states to
achieve, three states have received approval for combination waivers:
■ The Texas STAR+PLUS program was approved in January 1998. This
mandatory program serves disabled and elderly beneficiaries in Hous-
ton and uses three MCOs and a PCCM to deliver both acute and long-
term care services. The majority of enrollees are dually eligible for
Medicaid and Medicare and, although Medicare freedom of choice is
not restricted under this program, an enhanced drug benefit is pro-
vided as an incentive for enrollment in the same MCO for both Medi-
care and Medicaid services.
■ Michigan’s combination waiver, approved in June of 1998, serves
individuals with developmental disabilities. It provides mental health,
substance abuse, and developmental disability services under a prepaid
shared-risk arrangement.
■ Wisconsin converted an existing Section 1115 demonstration for
dually eligible adults with long-term care needs to a combination
waiver in June 2001. This demonstration manages only Medicaid-
financed long term care services.
Program waivers and demonstration projects are prevalent features of al-
most all states’ Medicaid programs. As discussed earlier, approximately 20
percent of Medicaid expenditures are devoted to statewide demonstration
costs. Over 57 percent of the Medicaid population is enrolled in managed
care, mostly through either Section 1115 demonstrations or Section 1915(b)
program waivers. In addition, home and community-based services waiv-
ers have changed the nature of service delivery for the elderly and people
with disabilities. However, since enrollment in most of these programs is
capped, institutionalization remains a significant part of state programs.
Taken as a whole, the combination of Medicaid Section 1115 demonstration
projects and Section 1915(b) and (c) waivers have dramatically altered the
way in which program eligibility is determined, services are delivered, and
payment is made in the Medicaid program.
MEDICARE RESEARCH AND DEMONSTRATION
PROJECTS IN DEPTH35
The Medicare program has primarily used research and demonstration
authority to test new ways to pay for and deliver services. As noted earlier,
the most commonly used statutory authority is found in Section 402 (as
amended by Section 222 of the Social Security Amendments of 1972). Sec-
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payment methodology and to cover services that are not normally cov-
ered, in order to demonstrate the effectiveness of these new services. Sec-
tion 222(a) authorizes the secretary to conduct experiments and demon-
strations that test alternative prospective payment methodologies.
Medicare’s payment system was established initially as a cost-based reim-
bursement system; over time, Congress and Medicare administrators have
made changes to it in order to the control growth of program costs. Many
Medicare payment system changes and alternative delivery approaches
adopted by Congress (especially in earlier days) have had their origins in
research and/or demonstration projects (Table 2).
Alternative Payment Systems
One area of the Medicare program that has been dramatically changed
by research and demonstration projects is payment policy. As with Med-
icaid, Medicare was initially established as a program that reimburses
hospital and other facilities for their incurred costs and physicians for the
charges they billed. Today, under the traditional fee-for-service program,
Medicare sets predetermined payment amounts for the majority of Medi-
care providers and for most covered services. Nearly all of the payment
systems in place today were initially tested as research and demonstra-
tion programs. These include the inpatient hospital prospective payment,
a PPS for skilled nursing facilities (SNFs), a PPS for home health, and a
PPS physician payment system that replaced the Medicare retrospective,
charge-based system.
■ Inpatient hospital prospective payment reform moved Medicare
from cost-based reimbursement to a prospectively determined per case
payment based on diagnosis. Research studies and demonstration
projects on case-mix measures, inflation factors, and rate setting re-
sulted in legislation requiring use of a system of diagnosis-related
groups (DRGs) as the method of Medicare payment for most hospital
care.36 Implemented in Medicare in 1983, the DRG system is also used
by half of the state Medicaid programs and many private insurers. It is
the most common form of hospital payment today.
■ A prospective payment system for skilled nursing facilities (SNFs)37
was mandated by the BBA in 1997. Based largely on research projects
using resource utilization groups (RUGS)—a system that classifies
patients on costs associated with their medical, functional, and personal
characteristics and their use of staff time—the system was implemented
in 1998. Previously, payment was a uniform amount per resident based
on each facility’s average cost. The new system pays different amounts
for residents of the same facility based on their resource needs, with
higher reimbursement for patients with more intense medical and
therapy needs.
■ Home health is another area in which rapidly escalating costs stimu-
lated the need for a prospective payment system. As directed by the
Nearly all of the pay-
ment systems in place
today were initially
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BBA, CMS adopted a new PPS for home health agencies (HHAs) in
October 2000. It is based on demonstration projects that began in 1990,
first testing a per-visit prospective payment discipline. This first phase
of demonstrations found little difference in cost between treatment and
control groups and no significant effects on the quality of care. A second
phase that began in 1995 tested a per-episode prospective payment
which provided a per-episode payment based on 120 days of care.
Outlier payments were provided for episodes that were longer than 120
days. The home health PPS system in place today pays HHAs a prede-
termined rate for each 60-day episode of home health care. To capture
differences in expected resource use, patients receiving five or more
visits are assigned to 1 of 80 home health resource groups based on
diagnosis, functional capacity, and service use.
■ Research projects also led to a new system for physician payments.
Physicians participating in Medicare are paid using the complex re-
source-based relative value scale, also known as RBRVS. This mecha-
nism is based on research studies conducted in the 1970s and 1980s that
developed and refined a uniform fee schedule that incorporates data on
the level of services provided for specific diagnoses along with geo-
graphic adjustments for paying physicians.38 It has replaced the Medi-
care retrospective, charge-based system. Physician payment reform was
enacted in 1989 and fully implemented in 1992. Both public and private
insurers now commonly use this system.
Managed care payment reforms have also been based on research projects
that tested the use of capitated amounts for each enrollee based on the
average fee-for-service spending for each enrollee’s demographic group.
Studies in the early 1980s showed that HMO enrollees tend to be healthier
than those in the fee-for-service program, indicating that capitation
amounts might be too high. As a result, HCFA tested several methods for
adjusting for enrollee’s health risks. Risk adjustment mechanisms such
as ambulatory care groups and diagnostic cost groups were developed
that use diagnoses from a prior year to predict program costs in a subse-
quent year.
Beginning in 1992, HCFA implemented global payment demonstrations
for high-cost/high-volume surgeries, such as heart bypass and cataract
removal, aimed at reducing costs and providing high-quality services.
Subsequent efforts to expand this concept in a larger “Centers of Excel-
lence” demonstration (renamed Medicare Partnerships for Quality Ser-
vices) covering invasive cardiovascular procedures and total joint replace-
ment were never brought to completion. However, while evaluations have
shown this concept to be successful, political opposition to selective con-
tracting has made widespread implementation difficult. CMS is currently
planning to implement a global payment demonstration for bypass sur-
geries that will focus on the sharing of quality data as well as the automa-
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Alternative Delivery Systems
Medicare benefits and the way they are delivered have changed over
the years as a result of research and demonstration projects. For example,
in the 1970s, the shortage of nursing home beds in many rural areas,
along with excess hospital capacity, led to the testing of the “swing-
bed” concept—the use of existing hospital resources to provide both acute
and long-term care. Legislation then authorized the rural swing-bed pro-
gram for small rural hospitals. The hospice benefit was also studied to
determine whether hospice care could maximize patient autonomy and
comfort during the last weeks of life, although legislation to add this ben-
efit was enacted before evaluation results were available.
Medicare HMO risk contracts were enacted into law in 1982 and imple-
mented in 1985, following an extensive research and demonstration ef-
fort.39 The use of capitation was tested and HCFA developed the adjusted
average per capita cost, or AAPCC, mechanism that is used to pay HMO
capitation rates. The studies showed that HMO participation in Medi-
care was a viable option. Originally, however, Medicare restricted the
development of managed care options to only those health plans that
were required to be federally qualified HMOs as defined in the HMO Act
of 1973. Participation in these projects was voluntary and enrollment was
low. The Medicare Choices demonstration that began in the mid-1990s
was designed to give beneficiaries a wider array of options among types
of managed care plans, including preferred provider organizations (PPOs)
and provider-sponsored networks. These projects were designed to test a
number of payment arrangements incorporating new ways for adjusting
payments to reflect medical risk. These demonstrations evolved into the
current Medicare+Choice program (enacted in the BBA) an effort to stimu-
late greater participation and choices for beneficiaries. Current efforts in
this area are discussed later in this paper.
Competitive Pricing
Another area that has stimulated much interest is the use of competitive
bidding to price Medicare goods and services. Despite popular support
for the concept, these projects have had difficulty getting off the ground.
Early efforts by HCFA to implement competitive pricing demonstrations
for Medicare-risk HMOs—in Baltimore in 1996 and in Denver in 1997—
were met by strong opposition from health plans and political pressure at
the state and national level. Both of these demonstrations were suspended
before they could be implemented—in Denver as the result of a court
ruling. Shortly thereafter, Congress mandated the Medicare Prepaid Com-
petitive Pricing Demonstration Project in the BBA. The demonstration
was intended to test an approach under which payments to
Medicare+Choice plans would be determined through a competitive bid-
ding process. In targeted areas, HCFA–contracted plans were to have sub-
mitted a bid price for a specified Medicare benefit package. That price
In the 1970s, the short-
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was then to have been compared to a set payment contribution from HCFA
to all plans in the area. Plans with a price below the contribution level
would have offered additional benefits, while those above the contribu-
tion level would have charged an additional premium to cover the differ-
ence. However, both health plans and beneficiaries generated bipartisan
political pressure, and Congress stopped the project before the demon-
stration started. Health plans opposed competitive pricing because they
feared lower prices, while beneficiaries opposed it because they feared
that their benefits might be reduced.
CMS has conducted successful demonstrations to test the impact of two
variations of competitive bidding.40 Both demonstrations tested whether
competition could lower prices without adversely affecting quality or ac-
cess. CMS conducted a competitive bidding demonstration for durable
medical equipment (DME) in two sites: Polk County, Florida, and San
Antonio, Texas. During the three years of competition for DME goods
and services, providers lowered their prices an average of 20 percent per
year. Evaluations have generally characterized both the quality of the goods
and services and beneficiaries’ access to them as good. The demonstration
ended in both sites on December 31, 2002, when congressional authority
expired and was not reauthorized, but efforts are underway to expand and
integrate competitive bidding for DME into the Medicare program.
A Medicare demonstration conducted between 1991 and 1996 had pro-
viders compete on price and quality to receive a bundled payment for all
inpatient hospital and physician services related to coronary artery by-
pass grafts. HCFA selected seven provider organizations, each of which
could market itself as a Medicare participating heart bypass center. An
evaluation showed that the demonstration reduced costs and increased
quality; however, contrary to what many had expected, it did not increase
the market share for the majority of participating sites. CMS attempted to
continue these demonstrations but was unsuccessful when too few pro-
viders responded to the solicitiation notice.
Much interest remains in using market principles to purchase goods and
services within Medicare. The Medicare prescription drug proposals cur-
rently pending in Congress place strong emphasis on the use of competi-
tion as a pricing mechanism in the future. Experiences in these earlier
demonstrations could provide valuable lessons for moving forward in
this regard.
SERVING THE FRAIL ELDERLY
Over the last ten years, there has been growing state, federal, and industry
interest in conducting demonstration projects to test delivery systems for
the frail elderly, many of whom are eligible for both Medicare and Medic-
aid. The population of “dual eligibles” comprises only about 15 percent of
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24 percent of Medicare expenditures and 35 percent of Medicaid expendi-
tures. A number of states have proposed projects that attempt to integrate
care for frail elders in hopes of improving coordination and access to care.
However, since both the federal government, in its role as Medicare ad-
ministrator, and the states, as Medicaid administrators, must be involved,
negotiations are difficult and have resulted in limited projects to date.
These projects are complex because of the need to use both Section 1115
authority and Medicare demonstration authority to make the two pro-
grams work together. A key point of contention has been budget neutral-
ity. CMS has required that the calculations be made separately for Medic-
aid and Medicare, and savings from one program can not be used to off-
set spending in the other program. This policy has greatly limited states’
ability to propose and receive approval for demonstrations for the dually
eligible. In addition, one of the key tenets of the Medicare program is to
ensure freedom of choice of providers, which has prevented states from
using a mandatory managed care approach. Other issues include
Medicare’s and Medicaid’s conflicting enrollment policies, appeal rights,
and health plan qualifications; CMS has been reluctant to provide more
flexibility to states in these areas for Medicare beneficiaries.
Nonetheless, two projects have been mandated by Congress and are op-
erational and two states have implemented small demonstrations for frail
elders. (Other projects are in the developmental stage.)
Program for All-Inclusive Care for the Elderly
The Program for All-Inclusive Care for the Elderly (PACE) is a capitated
managed care benefit for the frail elderly age 55 and older who would
otherwise require a nursing home level of care. Comprehensive medical
and social services are delivered in adult day health centers, supplemented
by in-home and referral services. PACE built on the successful On Lok
Medicare demonstration that ran in San Francisco from 1983 to 1986. Con-
gress first required the DHHS secretary to implement PACE demonstra-
tion projects in 1986. In 1997, the BBA made PACE a permanent benefit
category under Medicare and allowed states the option to implement
PACE as part of the Medicaid state plan, without the need for waivers.
The numbers of PACE sites are limited under the law and the number of
people served through a PACE project can be limited. Currently, there are
approximately 6,000 enrollees in 25 PACE sites in 14 states.41
Social HMOs
Section 2355 of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 directed the secretary to
undertake S/HMO demonstration projects. S/HMOs integrate health and
social services with a coordinated case management system. They serve a
cross section of the elderly population, including both functionally im-
paired and well elderly. In July 2003, there were 114, 895 enrollees at four
S/HMO sites.42
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Providers are paid through a direct financial arrangement that pools funds
from Medicare, Medicaid, and member premiums in a fixed annual pre-
paid rate of 100 percent of the AAPCC of treating these patients in other
settings (5.3 percent higher than the Medicare+Choice county payment
rates). In March 2003, CMS released a Federal Register notice proposing that
S/HMOs be phased in to become regular Medicare+Choice plans and paid
at the standard rate, but with a “frailty adjuster” to increase payment rates
to account for the more complex needs of S/HMO members. However, the
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) has recently released
a report disagreeing with the CMS proposal and proposing that the con-
version of S/HMOs into Medicare+Choice plans take place as scheduled
at the end of 2003. MedPAC does not recommend use of a frailty adjuster at
this time, but suggests that DHHS study payment adjustments for the frail
population in the Medicare+Choice program.43
Evercare Choice
Evercare Choice is another demonstration that provides services to dual
eligibles. In operation since 1993, Evercare’s primary goal is to provide
better case management for permanent nursing home residents. The pro-
gram does not expand the Medicare benefit per se but brings physicians
and geriatric nurse practitioners to the bedside at the nursing home. It is
intended to improve the quality of care and health outcomes and to de-
velop practice guidelines. As of September 2003, Evercare has enrolled
24,000 nursing home residents in 11 states.44
The prescriptive nature of integrated service delivery systems has made
them difficult to replicate on a large scale. For example, in PACE, only a
subset of dual eligibles—those who require a nursing home level of care—
can be served. In addition, the adult day care model used in PACE has
proven to be a deterrent for individuals who strongly prefer home-based
care. These limitations have led to states’ interest in other initiatives for
dual eligibles. Two states, Minnesota and Wisconsin, have implemented
dual eligible demonstration projects. Minnesota’s Senior Health Options,
which was implemented in 1997, is unique in that the state (rather than the
federal government) contracts with health plans to provide Medicare ser-
vices. In 1998, Wisconsin established its Partnership Program to serve the
frail elderly as well as individuals with physical disabilities; the program
uses a model similar to PACE’s. Two additional projects—the Monroe
County (New York) Continuing Care Network Demonstration (approved
in 1999) and the Massachusetts Senior Care Options demonstration (ap-
proval anticipated by October 2003)—have not yet begun enrollment.
CURRENT INITIATIVES, FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Current initiatives in research, demonstration, and program waivers are
driven by many of the same forces that have driven the use of waivers
since the early 1980s. Health care costs continue to increase at rates
The prescriptive na-
ture of integrated ser-
vice delivery systems
has made them diffi-
cult to replicate on a
large scale.
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considered to be unsustainable. A substantial portion of the population
continues to lack health insurance, and quality of care continues to be a
challenging issue. As the factors contributing to these problems have
evolved over the years, research and demonstration projects and program
waiver initiatives also have changed. For example, several current initia-
tives address the increasingly larger share of budgets devoted to the cost
of pharmaceuticals and to serving elderly or disabled individuals, whose
costs make up more than 70 percent of Medicaid expenditures.
Pharmacy Plus
In the absence of a Medicare prescription drug benefit, Pharmacy Plus
Section 1115 research and demonstration projects are helping states to
control the high cost of pharmaceuticals. DHHS issued guidance for the
Pharmacy Plus Demonstration initiative in January 2001. Pharmacy Plus
demonstrations extend coverage to certain low-income elderly and dis-
abled individuals with incomes below 200 percent of the federal poverty
level who do not qualify for Medicaid. Drug benefits may differ from
those in the Medicaid state plan. These projects theorize that participants
will stay healthier, which will reduce service utilization and allow them
to spend down to Medicaid eligibility levels at a slower rate than they
would have without the program. Four states had approved projects as
of July 2003 and several more were pending.45 The unique feature of these
demonstrations is that they set a global spending cap on all Medicaid
beneficiaries over age 65, including the newly eligible, putting states at
financial risk for all Medicaid costs associated with this population. The
current debate over the Medicare prescription drug benefit will undoubt-
edly have a significant impact on these demonstrations. Many analysts
are predicting that states might discontinue them if a new benefit is en-
acted, even though the bills do include incentives to encourage states to
maintain their programs.
Independence Plus
CMS is also promoting more choices for consumers through the Indepen-
dence Plus initiative. Based on the cash and counseling model, this initia-
tive continues opportunities for seniors and people with disabilities to
direct their own services. CMS has developed standard application tem-
plates for both the Section 1915(b) and Section 1115 programs. Section
1115 is used when eligible beneficiaries and their families receive a cash
allowance directly. Arkansas, Florida, and New Jersey have converted
their cash and counseling demonstrations into Independence Plus dem-
onstrations; New Hampshire and South Carolina received approval for
Section 1915(b) programs in December 2002. Consumer advocates are
clamoring for more of these types of community-based services as an al-
ternative to institutions. The impetus for this movement was the Olmstead
decision by the Supreme Court, which affirmed individuals’ rights to live
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in the least restrictive environment.46 Concerns about the total costs of
community-based programs to states’ Medicaid programs, however, have
led most states to continue their programs with capped enrollments.
Health Insurance Flexibility and Accountability
The Health Insurance Flexibility and Accountability demonstration ini-
tiative was announced by the secretary of DHHS in August 2001.47 It pro-
vides states with an opportunity to expand health care coverage to more
individuals and new flexibility to design their programs through the use
of Section 1115 authority. HIFA continues many of the features from pre-
vious statewide health care reform and SCHIP demonstrations. Budget
neutrality is calculated in much the same way, but HIFA allows states to
use excess SCHIP allotment dollars to fund eligibility expansions. It does
not restrict the use of SCHIP funds to parents and pregnant women, so
single adults can also be covered. It also encourages the use of premium
assistance to help families and individuals purchase private insurance
through employers. HIFA set a precedent for expanding coverage to ad-
ditional populations by permitting reduced benefits and increased cost
sharing for populations that states were already covering under their Med-
icaid programs. This approach was previously permitted in a limited num-
ber of projects on a case-by-case basis. However, HIFA signaled the Bush
administration’s willingness to consider proposals to limit benefits and
increase cost sharing on a wide scale. This approach has aroused much
controversy around appropriate minimum federal standards. In light of
the recent fiscal crisis in most states, some fear HIFA will lead to cost
containment without regard for the health care needs of eligible individu-
als, many of whom have very low incomes. Proponents of HIFA point out
that these projects provide health care coverage to many individuals who
would otherwise be uninsured.
Currently, eight states have received approval for HIFA demonstrations
and two more are under review.48 HIFA has gained added significance
because the administration’s Medicaid reform proposal in the fiscal year
2004 budget includes several features of the HIFA initiative. However,
the impact of HIFA demonstrations on the health care system and benefi-
ciaries is unknown at this time. To date, there have been no systematic
evaluations of HIFA, although some case studies are under way and a
federal evaluation is planned for the future.
Disease Management: “Waive” of the Future?
In Medicare, disease management initiatives are a significant part of the
current research and demonstration agenda. These activities are being
touted as the means to better coordinate care for beneficiaries and contain
costs, much as managed care was in the 1990s. The Medicare Coordinated
Care Demonstration Project, authorized in 1997 by the BBA, tests enhanced
quality of care and the effectiveness of paying on a fee-for-service basis for
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case management and disease management services that supplement rou-
tine care and enhance quality of care for the chronically ill. Beneficiaries
with chronic conditions such as asthma, diabetes, congestive heart fail-
ure and related cardiac conditions, chronic lung disease, and cancer re-
ceive comprehensive care planning, patient education, and ongoing moni-
toring between doctor visits. Some projects provide additional benefits.
CMS selected 15 demonstration sites in January 2001, and implementa-
tion began on a rolling basis in April 2002; more than 12,000 Medicare
beneficiaries now are enrolled.49
In the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Pro-
tection Act of 2000 (BIPA), Congress mandated the Medicare Demonstra-
tion Project for Disease Management. It targets beneficiaries with chronic
conditions of congestive heart failure, diabetes, or coronary heart disease
and requires the participating disease management organizations to pro-
vide full prescription drug coverage and assume risk for the cost of cov-
erage. These projects are primarily for beneficiaries in the Medicare fee-
for-service program; three sites are participating.
The Capitated Disease Management project was announced in February
2003. This CMS initiative will test the feasibility and appeal of specialty
Medicare+Choice-type plans targeted at beneficiaries with one or more
chronic conditions. Such plans will be paid on a predetermined, risk-ad-
justed rate each month, providing the Medicare benefit along with the dis-
ease management services. On the horizon are two additional demonstra-
tion projects dealing with disease management—one for beneficiaries with
end-stage renal disease and a larger scale population-based demonstration
in the traditional FFS Medicare targeted at beneficiaries with specific chronic
diseases with emphasis on outreach, education, and lifestyle modification.
Medicare + Choice: New Life?
Another area of interest is expanding the choices of providers for Medi-
care beneficiaries. Medicare+Choice was introduced as part of the BBA to
increase the range of alternatives to fee-for-service Medicare; however,
despite and initial rise, the numbers and types of health plans available
to Medicare beneficiaries has, in fact, decreased.50 As a result, CMS initi-
ated the Medicare Preferred Provider Organization Demonstration, which
began implementation during the January 2003 enrollment period. Thirty-
three health plans in 23 states are participating. This demonstration tests
direct contracting between Medicare and a variety of health plans, in-
cluding PPOs and provider-sponsored organizations. Partial capitation
and reinsurance are also being tested. Since its implementation in Janu-
ary, 54,000 Medicare beneficiaries have joined Medicare PPOs; however,
44,000 seniors are enrolled in one plan, Horizon Blue Cross/Blue Shield
of New Jersey, that brought them into the option from an existing Medi-
care HMO.51 Despite a slow start, CMS believes, enrollment will pick up
as seniors become more familiar with the PPO option.
The Capitated Disease
Management project will
test the feasibility and ap-
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CONCLUSION
The broadened use of research and demonstration authority, particularly
in Medicaid, during the Clinton and Bush administrations has caused
much controversy. In March and April 2001, as well as in June 2003, Con-
gress sent inquiries to CMS asking for detailed information about Medic-
aid Section 1115 demonstrations and expressing concerns about the ap-
proval process as well as quality, access, and the manner in which budget
neutrality is calculated. As noted earlier, the GAO has criticized HIFA in
particular for diverting SCHIP funds from children’s coverage to adults.
These types of controversies have surrounded research and demonstra-
tion projects and program waivers throughout their histories.
The overarching question, however, seems to be, what is the appropriate
role of research and demonstration projects? Changes to programs ac-
complished through these mechanisms can have a huge impact on ben-
eficiaries, providers, and the health care system as a whole. To the extent
that demonstrations change the program without legislative backing,
analysts have speculated, DHHS may be overstepping its bounds. On the
other hand, many features of public programs that are widely accepted
today were controversial when they were first tested through research
and demonstration projects. Legislative change can be slow to occur, par-
ticularly when states are having immediate budget crises and Medicare
Part B costs are rising at alarming rates. However, in each budget crisis,
innovative responses from states and the federal government have helped
to contain costs and have permitted the program to evolve. Especially in
Medicaid, the evolutionary use of program waivers and demonstrations
to provide greater and greater flexibility to states has changed the nature
of the program. In Medicare, research and demonstration projects have
significantly altered payment and delivery mechanisms over the years.
Projects are driven sometimes by administration policies, as seen in ear-
lier years of the Medicare program as well as in the current flurry of new
initiatives; sometimes by statutory mandates; and often in response to
rapidly escalating costs. Some have suggested that Medicare could ben-
efit from additional demonstration or waiver authority more similar to
Medicaid—to waive specific sections of title XVIII—in order to move the
program forward.52 The controversies are not likely to be resolved any
time in the near future. In the meantime, the experience gained from re-
search and demonstration projects and program waiver initiatives will
continue to help inform the debate about how best to address the chal-
lenges of uninsurance, cost containment, and quality of care facing the
nation’s health care system.
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Appendix
The Early History of Section 1115 Demonstrations
Since the creation of the Medicaid program, the federal government has
used Section 1115 demonstration authority to allow states to modify com-
ponents of their programs. Congress hoped that innovative projects would
provide a scientific basis for improving the program through greater knowl-
edge of more cost-effective health care delivery strategies. An early study
looked at demonstration projects initiated during the 15-year period be-
tween 1970 and 1984 and highlighted findings from various initiatives.53
This study documented that project activity accelerated during the 1970s
and peaked in 1981. Over that period, 213 demonstration projects were
initiated, most between 1976 and 1981. Activity in the areas of long-term
care, hospital care, and alternative payment and delivery systems during
these years contributed significantly to changes in the Medicaid program.
Long-Term Care
Between 1974 and 1981, almost three times as many demonstration projects
were conducted in the area of long-term care as in other areas. At that
time, as today, the rapid increase in cost growth of long-term care was a
serious concern. Long-term care service expenditures had increased about
26 percent annually from 1975 through 1982, due primarily to an increase
in the size of the aging population and greater acceptance of nursing home
care as an alternative to family caregivers. The Medicaid program was
based on a medical model with an institutional orientation. Services tend
to be provided by professional staff in institutional settings such as nurs-
ing homes. Demonstrations during this period began to test alternatives
to nursing home care, such as adult day care and community care, and
explored approaches such as case management, a single point of entry to
obtain services, and prospective payments for services. They hypothesized
that the amount of nursing home care could be reduced through the in-
creased use of paraprofessionals and the coordination of an appropriate
mix of health and social services. The demonstrations began a paradigm
shift toward addressing the person as a whole by attempting to address
the combination of social, psychological, and basic needs of daily living
(such as housing).
These demonstrations greatly increased knowledge about assessment
instruments that are used to determine the need for nursing home place-
ment. They found that most instruments of the day did not adequately
identify those at high risk for placement and that client selection was a
critical factor in reducing the amount of nursing home care. The lack of
appropriate assessment instruments for determining the need for nurs-
ing facility level of care, coupled with pressure to provide services to those
not otherwise eligible for placement in a nursing home, contributed to a
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finding that these demonstrations did not substantially reduce admissions
and were cost-effective only if linked to strong control over the nursing
home admission process. The most consistent findings were that beneficia-
ries did not suffer ill effects from residence in the community (there were
no significant effects on functioning or mortality) and were more satisfied
with their care in the community setting. However, the findings from the
demonstrations eventually provided the impetus for the enactment of Sec-
tion 1915(c), the home and community-based waiver program, in 1981.
Hospital Care
Another area of deep concern during the 1970s and early 1980s was the
fiscal crisis that was occurring in Medicaid hospital spending. Expendi-
tures in this area grew on average 16.7 percent annually over the period
from 1970 to 1980. During the 1970s, HCFA granted Section 222(a) or 402(a)
waivers to nine states or substate areas, to include Medicaid in opera-
tional prospective payment system programs. Also incorporating Medi-
care in many cases, these projects were the precursors to the Medicare
prospective payment system demonstrations discussed earlier in this
paper. The Medicaid statute at the time provided for a retrospective re-
imbursement based on cost. Under this system, reimbursement is maxi-
mized when more services are provided and hospital stays are longer. As
might be expected this led to rapidly escalating costs. Demonstrations in
New Jersey, New York, and Massachusetts, among others, took advan-
tage of demonstration waivers to address the fiscal crisis in Medicaid
hospital spending. The projects experimented with providing payments
to hospitals on a prospective per diem or per case basis. The demonstra-
tions added greatly to the body of knowledge about cost inflation for per
diem and per case payments, as well as inappropriate utilization and
uncompensated care.
Alternative Payment and Delivery Systems
Medicaid, as originally enacted, was a program that paid providers solely
on a retrospective fee-for-service basis. The federal government soon rec-
ognized the incentives this payment methodology creates to maximize
reimbursement. DHHS decided to promote demonstrations to develop
HMOs that would accept Medicaid beneficiaries in order to research cost,
utilization, and quality under a capitated payment system. During the
early 1970s, however, only 12 states developed agreements with the HMOs
and most involved only one health plan. California was the exception
and contracted with multiple plans, but unethical marketing, poor access
and quality, and inappropriate reimbursement resulted in the develop-
ment of stringent regulation for HMOs participating in the Medicaid pro-
gram. None of these early projects were successful. They were met by
legal barriers to establishing risk-based provider organizations, low en-
rollment, and insurer and state government reluctance to participate.
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In 1978, rising costs led the federal government to consider again the wider
use of HMOs. Voluntary enrollment in qualified managed care plans was
available to Medicaid beneficiaries at the time, but few HMOs were ac-
cepting Medicaid enrollees and few beneficiaries were choosing to en-
roll. By 1980, there were plans in only 17 states with about 1 percent of
beneficiaries enrolled. HCFA then developed a major demonstration de-
signed to allow plans to compete, under the belief that competition would
lead to lower capitation rates and good quality. Projects were conducted
in New Jersey, Oregon, Massachusetts, and California, with states taking
more control as the designers of the alternative delivery systems. Once
again, the projects met with only limited success.
In 1982, HCFA funded seven demonstration projects in six states to test
innovative health care financing and delivery approaches including a
variety of capitated or partially capitated arrangements; for the first time,
some projects included mandatory enrollment.54 However, these demon-
strations tended to be small and, as a whole, again met with limited suc-
cess. Nonetheless, some experience was gained in setting capitation rates,
recruiting providers, and enrolling consumers. It was also in this year
that Arizona’s entire Medicaid program, which uses a managed care
model, was approved under Section 1115 demonstration authority. After
a rocky start in 1982, the Arizona Medicaid program has operated con-
tinuously as a demonstration to this day.
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